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We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic
solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing
to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands
of an appointed leader–the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired
gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person
enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally
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The problems of externalities and public goods are among the oldest and most widely
studied market failures in economics. Numerous authors have proposed mechanisms to
implement Pareto eﬃcient allocations in these circumstances. These mechanisms, and
their diﬃculties, are well known. Getting full revelation of preferences in a dominant
strategy mechanism is diﬃcult or impossible, and Nash equilibrium mechanisms are
often not individually rational. Moreover, such mechanisms can be complex, abstract,
and diﬃcult to implement. (For a review, see Myerson (2008).)
Recently economists have been turning to a more practical formulation of this
problem. Imagine a small group of individuals who have a clear notion of what an
eﬃcient allocation of costs or eﬀorts would be. For instance, groups can easily agree to
equal cost sharing for a public good, or cost sharing for maintaining a commons that
is proportional to use. Communities adopt norms of proper communal behavior which
limit or forbid externalities on neighbors or other group members. How might a group
create a governance scheme that could be low cost to implement, easy to understand,
result in sustained (second-best if it is costly) eﬃcient allocations, and suﬀer only small
costs of sanctions oﬀ the equilibrium path? See, also, Ostrom, Walker and Gardner
(1992).
A special problem faced by small self-governing groups, such as neighborhoods,
clubs, and academic departments is that punishments meted out by members, as sug-
gested by Fehr and Gachter (2000), can often be quite deleterious. Peers often punish
to the extent that they erase any gains brought on by the punishment resulting in net
losses in the short run (see Egas and Riedl, 2008; Gachter, Renner and Sefton, 2008;
Herrmann, Thoni and Gachter, 2008; Botelho, Harrison, Pinto and Rutstrom, 2007;
Fehr and Gachter, 2002). And, since individuals apparently enjoy the act of punish-
ing (Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010), this can result in counter-punishment and revenge
cycles (Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis, 2008; Denant-Boemont, Masclet
and Noussair, 2007) that further deplete the social surplus.
In contrast to this, we propose a mechanism that is based on a single simple rule of
punishment of noncompliance. The rule is easy to understand, low cost to enforce, in
equilibrium results in no punishments and full compliance, and when oﬀ the equilibrium
path typically results in punishments that will be small. These are all advantages of the
mechanism. However, to avoid revenge and retribution, the rule must be implemented
in a way that isolates the enforcer. This means appointing or hiring someone from
either within or outside the group to enforce the rule. For this reason we call our
device the Hired Gun Mechanism.
A central feature of the Hired Gun is that the enforcer does not need to perfectly
document all the noncompliance. The Hired Gun, only needs to know the exact actions
of the two largest deviators from compliance. In many instances the biggest deviators
(think of loudest neighbors, worst teachers, most truant volunteers) are easy to identify.
Moreover, the enforcer does not need to punish all non-compliant people, just the
single biggest cheater. Finally, the punishment need not be large. It only needs
to be just big enough that the most non-compliant person would rather have been
the second most non-compliant person. If the second most non-compliant person is
best responding to his or her environment, the two most non-compliant choices should
be nearly identical, meaning that in expectation this diﬀerence should be trivial. It
follows that punishments oﬀ the equilibrium path will likely be small. Hence, even
if our mechanism requires some experience to reach equilibrium, the costs along that
2road should be minimal.
Our intuition for the Hired Gun comes from two sources. First is simple observation
of real life mechanisms. Speeding tickets are not generally issued to everyone on the
freeway going over the speed limit, but rather tend to be assigned to the fastest car
on the road. To avoid a speeding ticket, one only needs to be the second fastest
car. Likewise, the noisiest neighbor will get the call from the superintendent, the
neighborhood association will address the most egregious code violations ﬁrst, and
the department chair will deal with the worst teachers before going to others, the
club will ostracize the member with the worst service record. That is, enforcement of
compliance in the real world often focusses ﬁrst, and often exclusively, on the most
egregious violators.
The second source of intuition is from the Keynesian p-beauty contest games (Ho,
Camerer and Weigelt, 1998; Nagel, 1995). Imagine a game in which the winner of
a prize is the person who guesses a number between 0 and 100 that is closest to two-
thirds of the average of the others’ guesses. As long as there is common knowledge of
rationality, people will realize that(through iterated deletion of dominated strategies)
the only way for everyone to be two-thirds of the average is if they all guess 0, which
is the Nash equilibrium. Our mechanism turns this intuition upside down. Here the
loser will be the one who gained the most by deviating from full compliance, and the
penalty will be enough to make them wish they had been the second biggest cheater
rather than the biggest. The only equilibrium in which everyone can avoid being the
biggest cheater (again with common knowledge of rationality) is full compliance.
Others have also discussed worlds in which punishment is focussed on the largest
free rider. Boyd, Gintis and Bowles (2010) and Sigmund, Silva, Traulsen and Hauert
(2010) present evolutionary models in which punishing free riders is “coordinated” and
punishment has “increasing returns,” which combine to show social forces will evolve
to coordinate on the largest free riders. Steiner (2007) models a world similar to that of
Fehr and Gachter (2002) in which he assumes punishment is motivated by (potentially
small amounts of) anger, and that anger is directed at only the worst free rider. The
study most similar to ours is by Yamagishi (1986). His mechanism diﬀers from ours in
that individuals ﬁrst play a public goods game, then make voluntary contributions to
a punishment mechanism. Here we assume individuals procure a hired gun before the
contributions stage, hence institutionalizing the governance ex-ante. Although we do
not discuss it in this paper, as we show in a companion paper (Andreoni and Gee, 2011),
hiring a gun, for a small enough cost, can be welfare improving by allowing individuals
to socially commit to a sub-game perfect enforcement regime. The companion paper
shows that individuals in our experiment easily recognize this and endogenously acquire
the delegated punishment scheme. The current paper provides the groundwork for this
by explaining and testing the eﬃcacy of the Gun for Hire mechanism.
In what follows we present a formal statement of the Hired Gun Mechanism and
provide an experimental test. The experiment reveals both the power of the mechanism
and, in one session, the reliance on (common knowledge of) rationality.
2 The Mechanism
We derive and test our game within the context of a linear public goods game (LPG).
The LPG game is the workhorse of experiments on free riding and externalities. The
linearity makes the ideas easier to present, however the model is easily demonstrated
3in a nonlinear environment.
In the LPG, each individual i is endowed with wi. Each allocates gi, 0 · gi · wi,
to the public good and consumes the rest, wi ¡ gi. Each person receives one util for
each unit of wi kept, and α for each unit allocated to the public good by themselves and
all others. So i’s payoﬀ is πi = wi ¡ gi + α
∑n
j=1 gj. Assuming, as is usual, 0 · α < 1
and nα > 1 then the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is total
free riding, gi = 0 by all players, while the socially agreed Pareto eﬃcient allocation
is complete contribution, gi = wi. Thus, full compliance with the socially proscribed
optimum is for gi = wi for all.1
We assume for our mechanism that members of the community commonly under-
stand the socially desirable action of each individual, that is, they all agree that wi = gi
is socially desirable, and that deviation from this action is undesirable. The wi could
represent equal cost sharing for instance, or perhaps a proportional tax, or simply pro-
viding no negative externalities on others in the group. For these purposes, it becomes
convenient to write our model in terms of the deviations from the socially desirable
Pareto eﬃcient allocation. Thus, deﬁne
di = wi ¡ gi
as i’s deviation from his assigned contribution. Deﬁne d = (d1,d2,...,dn) as the vector
of deviations from full compliance. Then payoﬀs to i can be written in terms of di
rather than gi :










i=1 wi. In this formulation, di = 0 for all i is clearly the socially desired
outcome.
2.1 Size of Shot Fired by the Hired Gun
Deﬁne dz as the largest element of the vector d, that is, dz ¸ di for all i. Let S
be the set of potential contributors and L(d) µ S be the set of contributors with the
largest deviations. Finally, deﬁne dy as the second largest deviation. In particular if
L(d) ½ S, then dy is the highest di for all i in SnL(d). However, if L(d) = S, then
di = dj for all i and j and there is no second highest deviator.
In the Hired Gun Mechanism, the largest deviator(s) are the only one(s) punished
and the punishment is just suﬃcient to make the biggest deviator strictly prefer to
have been the second biggest deviator. Let P(di,d) be the punishment required by
the mechanism for an individual who chooses di when the vector of choices is d. Then
the mechanism requires punishments such that πz(dz,d) ¡ P(dz,d) < πy(dy,d), that
is, the biggest deviator would rather have been the second biggest deviator. Assume
for convenience, and realism, that di can only be chosen in discrete amounts, and for
simplicity assume it takes integer values. Then, to assure punishments are as small
1More generally, let g = g∗ be any among the set of possible Pareto Eﬀecient allocations, where
g∗
i is perhaps chosen by some focal ideal, such as equal division (g∗
i = g∗
j, all i,j) or equal sacriﬁce
(g∗
i /wi = g∗
j/wj, all i,j).
4as possible, set the punishment on the biggest deviator to be P(dz,d) = πz(dz,d) ¡
πy(dy,d)+1 = dz¡dy+1. Note, if there are ties for the biggest deviator, then all must
be punished. In this case, punishment need only be high enough to break indiﬀerence,
that is the smallest integer unit of the private good, thus P = 1. The exception is if
all tie by being fully compliant. In this case, of course, there are no punishments.





1 if L(d) = S, and d 6= 0
0 if L(d) = S, and d = 0
dz ¡ dy + 1 if L(d) ½ S, and i 2 L(d)
0 if L(d) ½ S, and i / 2 L(d)
2.2 Equilibrium
It is easy to see that d = 0 is the unique equilibrium. Proof follows from elimination
of dominated strategies. Let m0 be the highest standard of compliance set for anyone
(this allows for m0 to be the same for all i). Then any di = m0 is sure to be the lowest
compliance level and i is sure to receive a punishment of at least 1. As such di will
never equal m0. In this case, anyone with compliance level m0 will act as if their true
compliance level is m0¡1. But if m0 is never chosen, then m0¡1 is sure to be punished
and anyone choosing it would be better oﬀ choosing m0 ¡ 2. Thus di = m0 ¡ 1 will
never be chosen by any i. We can repeat this logic, eliminating dominated strategies
until the only choice that is not eliminated is that di = 0 for all i. This demonstrates
that d = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
3 Experimental Design and Results
Our experimental test of the Hired Gun Mechanism is a within subject comparison
of behavior in the Linear Public Goods game (LPG) to the Hired Gun Mechanism.
Each session of the experiment employs 12 subjects divided into three groups of four
subjects. In each session, subjects ﬁrst play 10 periods of a LPG with strangers
matching (Andreoni, 1988). The same subjects then play another 10 periods, again
with strangers matching, but now are subject to the Hired Gun Mechanism. The Hired
Gun Mechanism was not explained to the subjects until period 10 was complete.
We chose this design for two reasons. First, we wanted to present our mechanism
with a realistic and rugged terrain of a group that had become accustomed to signiﬁcant
degrees of free riding, hence creating the most challenging environment for the Hired
Gun mechanism. Second, if the Hired Gun can turn free riders into cooperators, then
this is the strongest kind of support one can get for the mechanism.
We conducted 4 sessions with 12 subjects in each session (N = 48). Subjects
were paid for a single randomly selected period. The experiment was conducted in
neutral language using z-tree software Fischbacher (2007). In each period subjects
were endowed with 5 tokens, w = 5. Each token invested in the private good paid a
return of $3 to the individual who invested it, while each token invested in the public
good paid a return of $2 to all group members. In terms of the game above, α = 2/3
and n = 4. If all subjects free ride, they earn $15, while if they all contribute w they
earn $40 each.
5In the Hired Gun game (periods 11-20) the player with the lowest contribution in
the group is punished the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and second lowest contributors
LPG payoﬀ plus the value of one unit of the private good, which was worth $3.2 Full
instructions and screen shots are available from the authors.3
3.1 Results
Figure 1, rounds 1 to 10, shows the results of the LPG game. The usual pattern
emerges, with contributions at or near the Nash equilibrium of total free riding for
many subjects by period 10. Figure 1, rounds 11 to 20, shows that employing the
Hired Gun Mechanism immediately pushed the subjects to almost full contribution in
periods 11-20. The LPG game reached only 27 percent of the eﬃcient allocation, while
with the Hired Gun eﬃciency averaged 91.2%. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, p = 0.037).4





































0 5 10 15 20
Period
LPG Session 1 GH Session 1
LPG Session 2 GH Session 2
LPG Session 3 GH Session 3
LPG Session 4 GH Session 4
Figure 2 shows that net earnings were signiﬁcantly improved with the Hired Gun.
Average earnings were $21.84 in the LPG periods, but jumped to $36.77 (net of punish-
ment costs) when there was a Hired Gun, again this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test p = 0.037 by session).
2In addition to the payoﬀs discussed here subjects in the experiment were also given a small lump
sum payment each period. These were in place to make income comparable to other treatments
discussed in our companion paper, Andreoni and Gee (2011). Since these do not alter the predictions,
for expository convenience we do not discuss them here. In the LPG game subjects were given a
lump-sum payment of $1 per period, while in the GH game subjects were given a $0.50 lump sum
payment. These lump sum payments are not included in the discussion of earnings in this paper.
3econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon or econ.ucsd.edu/~l1gee
4We treat each session average as an observation, so we have 4 observations for the LPG and 4
observations for the periods 11-20 of GH.











































0 5 10 15 20
Period
LPG Session 1 GH Session 1
LPG Session 2 GH Session 2
LPG Session 3 GH Session 3
LPG Session 4 GH Session 4
Figure 3 shows the average punishment costs per subject across rounds 11-20 were
indeed very small. This is especially true for sessions 2, 3, and 4 where these costs
drop to zero for periods 18 to 20.




















































10 12 14 16 18 20
Period
GH Session 1 GH Session 2
GH Session 3 GH Session 4
3.2 What was Diﬀerent about Session 1?
One can see quite plainly in the ﬁgures above that Session 1 stands out for being
less cooperative under the Hired Gun than the other three sessions. Why did this
happen? One reason may simply be that it was the ﬁrst session that we ran, and so
we as experimenters had not honed our presentation of the stimulus. However, it
also appears that the selection of subjects into Session 1 included an unusually high
proportion of what we will call unimproving players.
Say that an action by a player is unimproving if the player was punished in the
previous period, but she does not raise her next public contribution above her previous
7period’s contribution. Then deﬁne an unimproving player as one who takes two or more
unimproving actions during periods 12-20. In Session 1, one third of the subjects (4 of
12) were unimproving subjects, whereas in Sessions 2 and 3 there were no unimproving
subjects and session 4 had only a single unimproving subject among the 12. Although
the Hired Gun Mechanism still resulted in an improvement to public contributions and
earnings in Session 1, it was not as pronounced as in sessions 2, 3 and 4. This result
shows that the Hired Gun Mechanism is eﬀective, but that its full potency is dependent
upon the lack of unimproving actions of the players. Punishments are only eﬀective if
people want to avoid them, and realize how to change their actions to do so. Our Hired
Gun Mechanism will not fare well if subjects either do not want to avoid punishment
or do not understand how to avoid punishment. In other words, both the assumptions
of common knowledge of rationality and rationality itself may have been violated in
Session 1.
Although session 1 failed on one respect, it also showed an important advantage of
the Hired Gun Mechanism. Even in the presence of subjects who refused to conform
to the equilibrium, punishments stayed rather small—about 8% of gross earnings, and
25% of the increase in earnings relative to the LPG game. That is, equilibrium
responses of the more rational players to the stubbornly self-destructive actions of the
unimproving players assures that when things go wrong, they are not catastrophic.
4 Conclusion
We theoretically developed a simple mechanism for enforcing full compliance with a
socially agreed standard of cooperation, which we call the Hired Gun Mechanism. The
intuition for the Hired Gun is that, ﬁrst, in the world around us enforcement focusses
primarily if not exclusively on the worst violators; other violators go unpunished. Sec-
ond, using the analogy of a p-beauty contest, if we punish the largest deviator so that
the person would rather have been the second biggest deviator, the only point at which
everyone can be the second biggest cheater is if everyone is fully compliant. Thus the
mechanism is inexpensive to employ, since only the biggest deviants need to be moni-
tored, and optimizing behavior implies that the path toward the equilibrium will have
minimal punishments. Finally, since the punisher is a hired or appointed authority
following a publicly accepted rule, we can potentially avoid the cycles of retribution
and revenge that plague peer punishment.
We experimentally test our mechanism within subjects by ﬁrst giving them 10
rounds of experience, with strangers matching, of a standard linear public goods game
without any enforcement mechanism. As usual, by round 10 each session is rife with
free riding. In rounds 11-20 we then introduce the Hired Gun Mechanism. The
mechanism instantly raises contributions. In three of our four sessions, all 12 subjects
converged to the equilibrium of full compliance, and in all sessions the payoﬀs under
the Hired Gun were signiﬁcantly above the earnings without the mechanism. In
all sessions, punishments were small and did not have an appreciable impact on the
eﬃciency gains of the mechanism.
The Hired Gun Mechanism has many ecologically attractive features. First, it
is simple. As shown in the lab, most subjects catch on to the incentives in a few
short rounds. Second, it is low cost to enforce. This is because the enforcer need
only identify the two largest violators, and does not have to precisely monitor all
players. In life, the most egregious violators are typically also the easiest to identify
8and with our mechanism there is no need to distinguish ﬁne diﬀerences among any
more than the top two deviators. Third, by delegating enforcement to the Hired Gun,
the mechanism avoids problems of retribution and revenge. In this way it is a more
realistic model of actual self-governing mechanisms where authority ﬁgures (building
superintendents, department chairs, team captains, club presidents) enforce simple
rules of compliance. Fourth, the mechanism results in all players being better oﬀ
in equilibrium, thus is individually rational. Fifth, before reaching the equilibrium,
punishments remain small. This is because the best reply of rational players to a
player who stubbornly (and mistakenly) chooses to be noncompliant each period, is to
be only slightly more compliant than this person, thus naturally putting limits on how
costly punishments can be, but without erasing the information value of being punished
which is necessary for people to learn to avoid it. That is, the “slap on the wrist”
may be all that is needed to push society steadily and sustainably to Pareto eﬃcient
compliance. And sixth, the mechanism works quickly to reach eﬃciency and, once
reached, eﬃciency is sustained. It is worth noting as well, that all of these eﬀects were
accomplished in an experiment that provided a hostile environment for the mechanism.
Despite starting from a situation with rampant free riding, and being burdened with
random rematching that made reputations nearly impossible to build, three of our four
sessions exceeded 95% eﬃciency after fewer than three trials with the mechanism, and
reached complete eﬃciency within several trials.
In sum, the Gun for Hire Mechanism is simple, individually rational, ecologically
valid, and works nearly instantly in an experimental test to improve eﬃciency.
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